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STATE OIL SPILL PREVENTION LAWS
AND INTERTANKO:
WHEN IS STATE LAW PREEMPTED?
Paul H. Avery'
I. INTRODUCTION
Seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, the International Association
of Independent Tanker Owners (INTERTANKO), a trade association of
tanker operators, brought suit in 1996 against Washington State and local
enforcement officials who enforced Washington's Best Achievable
Protection (BAP) Regulations.' INTERTANKO challenged the constitu-
tionality of the BAP Regulations by asserting that federal regulations and
maritime law preempted its provisions: "Article VI of the Constitution
provides that the laws of the United States shall be the supreme law of the
land;... State laws notwithstanding."2 RITERTANKO founded its pre-
emption theory upon: (1) conflict preemption, whereby a State law is
invalid if it stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full objec-
tives of Congress; (2) field preemption, whereby federal regulation of oil
tankers dominates the entire subject; (3) express preemption, whereby the
BAP Regulations are expressly forbidden by federal statutes some of which
authorize the Coast Guard rather than States to act in this field; and (4) that
the BAP Regulations violate the Commerce Clause.3
In the spring of 2000, the Supreme Court handed down its ruling in
United States v. Locke.4 Regarding a state's ability to regulate oil tanker
traffic by utilizing provisions of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990' (OPA), the
Court pronounced a number of holdings. Specifically, the Court examined
Washington's BAP tanker regulations and found that some of the regula-
tions are preempted; as to the balance of the regulations, the Court
* University of Maine School of Law, Class of 2001.
1. See INTERTANKO v. Lowry, 947 F. Supp. 1484 (W.D. Wash. 1996).
2. See itL at 1490; see U.S. CoNsT. art. VI.
3. INTERTANKO v. Lowry, 947 F. Supp. at 1493-99.
4. See United States v. Locke, 120 S.Ct. 1135 (2000).
5. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-61 (1994).
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remanded the case so that the validity of the BAP Regulations may be
assessed in light of the considerable federal interest at stake.6 Each of the
BAP Regulations will be discussed in this Comment.
Washington provides a prime example for other coastal states of the
need for aggressive tanker regulation. It encompasses some of the
country's most significant waterways and its rocky Pacific coast presents
treacherous grounding points for any wayward tanker. Of premier import-
ance to Washington's coastal environment is Puget Sound, a body of water
spanning some 2,500 square miles which connects with the Pacific by way
of the Strait of Juan de Fuca, a twelve-mile wide channel reaching sixty-
five miles into the state's interior.7 The sound and strait are busily and
continuously plied by water traffic that includes small fishing vessels, cargo
ships, naval vessels, oil tankers, and barges destined for Washington or
Canada. The size and quantity of oil transport vessels have increased
dramatically in the last fifty years; oil tankers averaged 16,000 tons of
carriage in the 1940s, while numerous tankers exceeded 175,000 tons of
carriage in the 1970s.' Of all the world's merchant vessels in 1998, tankers
numbered 6,739. 9 The profound increase in size and quantity of oil
transport vessels has led Washington's environmentalists to seek compre-
hensive tanker regulation.
In addition to examining the Supreme Court's decision regarding
Washington's BAP Regulations, this Comment will also review the earlier
treatment of the BAP regulations and two other state plans to regulate oil
tankers plying their waters, discuss admiralty law, and examine state
utilization of OPA to regulate tanker vessels.
II. STATE TANKER VESSEL REGULATION
PRIOR TO THE SUPREME COURT'S LATEST HOLDING
A. Washington State's BAP Standards
Following passage of OPA in 1990, Washington State legislators
sought to prevent oil tanker spills by creating a new body of laws, namely
the Best Achievable Protection (BAP) Regulations, concurrent with
6. See United States v. Locke, 120 S. Ct. at 1152.
7. See id. at 1141.
8. See id. at 1141; See also Askew v. American Waterways Operators, 411 U.S. 325,335
(1972). The term "tons" refers to "deadweight tons" which is a way of measuring the cargo-
carrying capacity of a ship.
9. See United States v. Locke, 120 S.Ct. at 1141.
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creating a new agency to oversee their implementation. ° Washington's
BAP Regulations attempt to regulate oil tankers in state waters in a
comprehensive and thorough way, extending specifically to: (1) event
reporting; (2) operating procedures regarding crew watch practices,
navigation, engineering safeguards, pre-arrival tests, inspections, and
emergency procedures; (3) personnel policies that address crew training,
alcohol and drug use detection, evaluations, work hours, English language
proficiency, and record keeping; (4) vessel technology that includes mini-
mum standards of employment of GPS and radar technology; and (5)
advance notice of a vessel's entry into state waters along with periodic
safety reports while therein."
At trial, the District Court found BAP regulations were not preempted
by federal law and dismissed INTERTANKO's suit accordingly.' On
appeal in the Ninth Circuit, the United States intervened on INTER-
TANKO's behalf to assert that the District Court had failed to consider
federal law's proper scope of authority in foreign affairs. 3 The Court of
Appeals found that: (1) OPA's savings clause applies to the entire Act; (2)
BAP Regulations are not implicitly or expressly preempted by OPA; (3)
federal regulation of tankers preempts state regulation of design and
construction only; (4) regulations imposing operational requirements are
not subject to field preemption, but radar and emergency towing gear both
are preempted; (5) Coast Guard regulations allegedly preempting BAP
Regulations are beyond the Coast Guard's congressional delegated
authority; and (6) BAP Regulations do not unduly burden interstate com-
merce.' The Ninth Circuit reasoned that Washington State could enforce
its laws, except for the requirement that vessels install certain navigation
and towing equipment.'5 This preemption holding was virtually identical
to that of Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Company (ARCO), where the Court
preempted similar equipment requirements.1 6
B. California's Oil Spill Regulations
Analogous to Washington's BAP Regulations, California passed laws
requiring vessel liability for any environmental damage caused by oil
10. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 317-21-010-317-21-540.
11. See lNTERTANKO v. Lowry, 947 F. Supp. 1484, 1488-90 (W.D. Wash. 1996).
12. See id at 1500.
13. See INTERTANKO v. Locke, 148 F.3d, 1053, 1058, 1063, 1069 (1998).
14. See id. at 1060-69.
15. See i at 1067.
16. See Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978).
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spills.'7 These new laws churned in the wake of two Pacific-coast environ-
mental disasters involving tankers. The Harbors and Navigation Code,
which provided strict liability for oil spills, was passed in California after
the collision of two oil tankers near the Golden Gate Bridge dumped eight
hundred thousand gallons of oil into San Francisco Bay. 8 Likewise,
following the Exxon Valdez fiasco in Alaska, California expanded the reach
of these laws in the form of the Oil Spill Prevention and Response Act of
1990.9 Just as concern over increases in the size and number of oil tankers
in Washington's Puget Sound gave rise to the BAP Regulations, the 14.6
billion gallons of crude oil annually shipped via tanker to California
refineries has led to strict laws regulating oil transport. California requires
that tankers use tugboat escorts, have oil spill contingency plans, and
submit for inspection as to compliance with relevant federal laws.'
California followed the Court's decision in Ray v. ARCO by recognizing
that matters involving vessel design and construction are under exclusive
federal control, which includes the requirement that tanker vessels be
double-hulled by the year 2010.1 Proclaiming that "it is in the best interest
of the state to coordinate with agencies of the federal government,
including the Coast Guard, to the greatest degree possible," California
sought to expand the effectiveness of its legislation; through the wording
of its statutes, California incorporated federal spill prevention regulations
and thereby gained additional trained personnel to assist the Coast Guard
in fulfilling its directives.22 Conversely, by instituting a minimum depth for
anchorage in its waters, California has also enhanced existing federal
regulations to render them more acceptable in terms of either preemption
or maritime law.23 Other coastal states, including Maine, Massachusetts,
and Florida, have followed the lead of California and Washington by
enacting similar legislation, with Washington's BAP regulations being the
most comprehensive example. Moreover, by being the most far-reaching
standards, Washington's BAP Regulations have served as a lightning rod
for drawing attention to the issue of state regulation of tanker vessels.
17. See Brief of the States of Alaska et al., United States v. Locke, 120 S.Ct. 1135,
1998 U.S. Briefs LEXIS 1701, at *1.
18. See id. at *2.
19. See id.
20. See id. at *2-3.
21. See id. at *3.
22. See id., citing CAL. Gov. CODE §§ 8670.2(1), 8670.17, 8670.17.2, 8670.18,
8670.22, 8670.28-.31.
23. See United States v. Locke, 1998 U.S. Briefs LEXIS 1701, at *3-4. Local
regulation of vessels within maritime law will be discussed later in this Comment.
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C. Rhode Island's Oil Spill Pollution Prevention and Control Act
(OSPPCA)
In 1996, Rhode Island instituted the Oil Spill Pollution Prevention and
Control Act (OSPPCA), a statute that institutes a comprehensive approach
to preventing oil spills from oil transport barges.' The plan regulates the
industry with regard to equipment, construction standards, and personnel,
and establishes a safety committee to monitor the effectiveness of
regulations.' As OSPPCA's purpose is to protect the state's coastal
environment from oil spills, the legislation requires barges either to be
double-hulled in times of bad weather or have an extra tug serve as escort.'
Regardless of weather conditions, Rhode Island requires all barges to be
double-hulled by 2001, years ahead of OPA's standard for oil tankers
throughout the United States.27
In addition to double-hull requirements, OSPPCA institutes personnel
policies that require a crew to meet minimum standards of proficiency and
proscribe the consumption of alcohol or illicit drugs while a crew member
is on duty.' Additionally, a barge laden with oil must be occupied by two
crewmen at all times, whether underway or at anchor.29 Further in excess
of OPA's requirements, OSPPCA requires tanker vessels to be equipped
with radar, global positioning systems (GPS), a compass, two VHF radios,
fire and flood detectors, and manually deployable anchoring mechanisms.30
California, Washington and Rhode Island have each passed legislatioh that
regulates a wide variety of activities including tanker traffic on their
navigable waters as well as tanker construction standards. The Supreme
Court's INTERTANKO holding clearly proclaims that state tanker regula-
tions in conflict with federal requirements are unenforceable. Admiralty
law and federal pollution statutes such as OPA do not preclude state action;
on the contrary, they specifically reserve certain powers to the states. The
nature of these reserved powers will be examined in the following section.
24. See Robert Falvey, A Shot Across the Bow: Rhode Island's OSPPCA, 2 ROGER
WiUAMs U. L. REV. 363,364 (1997).
25. See i.
26. See id. at 365.
27. See U
28. See id. at 366.
29. See id.
30. See id. at 367.
124 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6:119
m11. MARITIME LAW: HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
A. The Limitation of Liability Act of 1851
OPA, in part, nullifies a tanker vessel owner's ability to limit his
liability.3' The historic development of a ship owner's limitation of liabil-
ity, as granted by the Limitation of Liability Act of 185132 (Act of 1851),
is key to understanding why OPA's authors felt necessary to eliminate a
ship owner's statutory haven after an oil spill. Congress advocated the Act
of 1851 as an attempt to increase investment in the American Merchant
Marines by enabling vessel owners to limit their liability for harm caused
by the vessel to the amount of their investment in the vessel or, if disaster
strikes, to the post-catastrophic value of the vessel-a figure which is often
zero.33 The implications of this are far-reaching and run counter to much
traditional tort liability law. If, for instance, one vessel rams another and
causes $700,000 damage, the liability of the owner of the ship at fault will
not exceed the after-accident appraised value of his vessel. An amendment
to the Act of 1851 requires the vessel owner to establish a fund to cover the
costs of personal injuries arising from accidents. Congress currently
requires vessel owners to contribute $420 per-vessel-dead-weight ton to a
fund from which claimants can receive recompense for injuries.'
The Act of 1851 is quite comprehensive; it is nearly always applicable
in maritime disasters, provided the vessel owner was not privy to the cause
of the accident.35 As nearly every vessel today is corporate owned and
under the command of someone other than the owner, the Act of 1851 is
broadly applicable. Their immense size and expense-and consequent
potential for liability-has given rise to the situation that tanker vessels in
particular are owned exclusively by major corporations who, in turn, shield
themselves from liability. Congress has recently reexamined the continued
relevance of the Act of 1851 in light of the fact that most vessels today,
even if owned by American corporations, are not flagged in the United
States and therefore are technically not part of an "American" Merchant
Marine. The potential for even a single wayward tanker to cause immense
and expensive damage has prompted Congress to deny the Act's applicabil-
ity in certain accidents involving oil spillage. This Comment will later
31. See Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2702, 2704 (1994).
32. See Limitation of Shipowner's Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. App. §§ 181-196 (1994).
33. See id. § 183.
34. See id § 183(b).
35. See id. § 181.
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examine the statutory removal of the Act of 1851 as Congress permitted in
OPA.
B. The Robins Drydock Rule
The Robins Dry Dock rule has come to mean that no cause of action
arises against a vessel for purely economic harm. In Robins Dry Dock v.
Flint, the Court held that a plaintiff who had time-chartered a vessel (leased
a vessel for a contracted period of time) had no cause of action for loss of
use of his chartered vessel that arose from ship repairer negligence. 6
Robins Dry Dock holds that a wayward vessel must cause actual physical
damage for a third-party damage claim to proceed.37 Circuit courts have
broadly applied Robins Dry Dock to maritime situations. In 1982, for
example, when a vessel grounded and backed-up river traffic along the
lower Mississippi, many vessels that were delayed from departing
Louisiana sued the grounded vessel for monetary damages. The Fifth
Circuit, following Robins Dry Dock, held that the stranded vessel was
immune from charges because it caused no physical harm to the vessels that
brought suit."
In a situation more akin to an oil spill, the Fifth Circuit again failed to
find a negligent vessel owner liable. Following the common law rule in
Robins Dry Dock, the Court dismissed a suit by Louisville & Nashville
Railroad Company against a wayward vessel that had rammed a train
bridge and caused train traffic rerouting for many days. The Fifth Circuit
held the rerouting of trains was a purely economic loss for which the vessel
could not be held liable.39 Marking the absence of a statute making vessel
owners liable for economic damage, these cases demonstrate the power of
the Robins Dry Dock rule to limit or deny the liability of vessel owners.
Moreover, absent a limiting statute, the Robins Dry Dock rule would
exonerate an oil tanker owner of any liability in suits brought, for example,
by tourist industries such as beach hotel operators that suffer economic
harm when an oil spill disrupts tourism.
36. See Robins Dry Dock v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303, 309 (1927).
37. See id.
38. See Akron Corp v. M/T Cantigny, 706 F.2d 151, 152-53 (5th Cir. 1983).
39. See Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. MV Bayou Lacombe, 597 F.2d 469,
474 (5th Cir. 1979).
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C. Seaworthiness
Maritime tradition holds that an owner must warrant that the vessel he
sends to sea is fit for its intended service; that the vessel is seaworthy.4'
However, the owner is not required to send an accident-proof vessel to
sea.4 Among other things, the duty of seaworthiness requires a vessel
owner to provide a competent crew. A crew would be found lacking in
competence when, for example, a seaman uses the wrong gear when the
proper gear is available.42 Many provisions of this traditional common law
warranty, including minimum hull requirements for tankers and liability for
certain negligent acts by crewmen, are now codified in OPA.
IV. ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION AND MARITIME TORTS:
THE CONNECTION WITH MARITIME ACTIVITY TEST
When an airliner crashed on Lake Erie, the airline company sought a
hearing in an admiralty court (where there is no jury) to eliminate a
sympathetic jury assessing a large liability claim.43 However, lack of
proper subject matter jurisdiction precluded the admiralty court from
hearing the case.' After appeal, the Supreme Court agreed, holding that
the admiralty court had no jurisdiction in this matter because there was no
connection between the plane crash and a traditional maritime activity. To
alter the situation such that admiralty jurisdiction would apply, the Court
stated that a downed airliner would have to be destined for an island or on
a transoceanic flight in order for there to be a sufficient nexus with tradi-
tional maritime activity and admiralty cognizance.45
In Jerome B. Grubart v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., the Supreme
Court again determined the extent of admiralty jurisdiction in 1995. 4 The
full implications of the Act of 1851 utilized in tandem with the Extension
of Admiralty Act became obvious when a vessel caused a major flood in
downtown Chicago. In spite of there being water involved in this tort,
Chicago argued that this was still a "dry-land" tort, which had nonetheless
40. See FRANK L. MARAIST, ADMIRALTY IN A NUTSHELL 193 (3rd ed. 1996).
41. See id.
42. See Jo D. LUCAS, ADMIRALTY: CASES AND MATERIALS 909 (Foundation Press
1996).
43. See Executive Jet Inc. v. Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249 (1978).
44. See id. at 251.
45. See id. at 270-273.
46. See Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527
(1995).
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drifted into the admiralty realm.47 The Grubart case began in 1993 after a
dredging company damaged an underwater tunnel that spanned many
basements in Chicago's downtown business district. When the tunnel burst
and flooded much of the below ground office and utility space in Chicago,
the dredging company limited its liability to the value of the barge that it
had used in the dredging.s Needless to say, the suits against the dredging
company were far in excess of the value of a barge, but, according to
admiralty law, this was the extent of the company's liability for the
damage. Without admiralty jurisdiction, the dredge company could not
limit its liability. Chicago's argument notwithstanding, the Court found the
necessary nexus between traditional maritime activity (dredging a harbor
channel) and the tort for there to be admiralty cognizance in this dispute,
and therefore, Chicago and the other claimants could not recover more than
the value of the dredge company's barge.49 In light of the Court's holding
in Grubart, the Exxon Valdez catastrophe provides a quintessential
maritime-environmental disaster that exemplifies the need for statutory
prohibition of a ship owner's ability to limit liability.
V. CONGRESSIONAL MANAGEMENT OF MARINE POLLUTION
A. The Clean Water Act (CWA)
Since 1972, Congress has relied upon the Clean Water Act' (CWA) as
its primary mechanism to set oil pollution control standards and to establish
liability for oil spills. Furthermore, the CWA establishes regulations for oil
spill removal and recompense to those who are harmed.5' Although OPA
replaced much of the CWA's scheme for establishing responsibility for
clean-up costs, the CWA, nonetheless, continues to provide the framework
with which the federal government attempts to prevent oil spills.52
Section 311(b)(1) of the CWA mandates that "it is the policy of the
United States that there should be no discharges of oil or hazardous
materials into or upon the navigable waters of the United States."'53 The
statute further orders a complete prohibition on the release of any
47. See UL at 540.
48. See i at 529-530.
49. See id at 547.
50. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
51. See id. § 1321.
52. See DONNA CHRwiE, COASTALAND OCEAN MANAGEMENT LAw IN A NuTsHELL
250(1994).
53. See 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(3).
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dangerous substance in quantities that may be harmful.' The CWA's
prohibition against harmful discharges applies to: (1) the navigable waters
of the United States; (2) the 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zone; and (3)
the waters of the Outer Continental Shelf." Navigable waters are those that
are affected by the ebb and flow of tides or waters involved in interstate
commerce.
56
In both admiralty law and the CWA, the term "navigable" is legally
broad and can include such seemingly "unnavigable" locales as a tidal
marsh. The CWA defines oil as "oil of any kind or in any form, including,
but not limited to, petroleum, fuel oil, sludge, oil refuse, and oil mixed with
wastes other than dredged spoil."57 The CWA further declares to be
hazardous any substance that, when introduced to navigable water, poses
a threat to public health and safety.58 Harmful quantities of such materials
are established if (1) the spill violates applicable water quality standards;
or (2) it causes a film or sheen upon the surface or causes sludge or
emulsion to be deposited beneath the water's surface.5 9
Civil enforcement of the CWA through administrative orders and
injunctive relief remains available to address an imminent threat to public
health, including that posed by an oil spill." Despite these regulations,
however, additional oil spills demonstrated to Congress the need for more
aggressive preventative and punitive regulations.
B. The Ports and Waterways Safety Act (PWSA)
The Ports and Waterways Safety Act 6' (PWSA) and the Port and
Tanker Safety Act of 197862 collectively attempt to prevent oil spills by
addressing issues untouched by the CWA. The Acts call for improved
standards in ship design, construction, and operation procedure.'
Additionally, the PWSA grants authority to the Coast Guard to regulate and
monitor tanker traffic. 6 The PWSA grants the Coast Guard broad powers
to control the movement of tankers operating upon the nation's navigable
54. See id. § 132 1(b)(3) & (4).
55. See id. § 1321(b)(1).
56. See Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. 443, 453-57 (1851).
57. See 33 U.S.C. § 1321(a).
58. See id § 1321(b).
59. See 40 C.F.R. § 110.3(b) (2000).
60. See CMHsTIE, supra note 52, at 254.
61. See Ports and Waterways Safety Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221-36 (1994).
62. See Port and Tanker Safety Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 1471 (1978).
63. See Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 160-70 (1978).
64. See 33 C.F.R. § 161.
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waters.' These powers include a vessel traffic control system to effect a
vessel routing plan, vessel size restrictions in narrow or shallow channels,
as well as speed limits.' The Coast Guard may also deny access into a
United States port to any vessels with a history of accidents or spills, as
well as any vessel that disregards Coast Guard safety standards, such as
sailing with an inadequately trained crew.67 The PWSA advances tanker
safety by requiring the Coast Guard to regulate vessel design, repair, and
operation procedures.' These regulations include standards for a ship's
maneuvering ability, stopping distance, as well as recommendations that
will lessen the likelihood of a grounding and collision.69 The PWSA
applies to domestic and foreign flagged vessels operating in United States
waters. 70
C. The Oil Pollution Act (OPA) of 1990
In addition to the CWA and the PWSA, Congress has enacted other
water pollution control measures. As early as 1924, the federal government
promulgated its first oil pollution control act.71 Such efforts failed to keep
up with the advance of ship technology-when Congress enacted these
laws, tankers were but a fraction of the size of a modem supertanker.
During the 1960s, accidents involving supertankers alarmed environmental-
ists who soon persuaded Congress to consider bolstering federal environ-
mental protection efforts through modification of existing statutes and
stricter regulation of tanker vessels. 72 The disastrous Torrey Canyon
accident off the coast of Britain in 1967 hastened such efforts, in great part
because the Act of 1851 permitted the owners of the Torrey Canyon to limit
their liability to the value of the vessel post-disaster, which in this case was
nearly nothing.73 Moreover, the CWA and the PWSA both left many
elements of tanker regulation unaddressed.
65. See 33 U.S.C. § 1221.
66. See id. § 1223(b).
67. See id. § 1228(a).
68. See id. § 1223; See also JOSEPHKALO et al., CoAsTALANDOcEANLAw, CASES AND
MATERIALS 688 (3rd ed. 1999).
69. See KALO, supra note 68, at 688.
70. See id.
71. See Mathew P. Harrington, Necessary and Proper, But Still Unconstitutional: The
Oil Pollution Act's Delegation of Admiralty, 48 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1, 4 (1997).
72. See Elizabeth R. Millard, Anatomy of an Oil Spill: The Exxon Valdez and the Oil
Pollution Act of 1990, 18 SETON HALLLEGIS. J. 331, 332 (1993).
73. See id at 331; See Limitation of Shipowner's Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. App. § 183
(1994).
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The grounding of the Exxon Valdez and the short-comings of existing
statutes precipitated congressional discussion that led to the passage of
OPA in 1990. In the preceding year, Captain Hazelwood of the Exxon
Valdez, probably drunk and otherwise not following procedure, foundered
his vessel upon Bligh Reef in Prince William Sound, Alaska. The 987-foot
vessel dumped eleven million gallons of oil that killed innumerable marine
animals.74 Damage to the Alaskan fisheries alone has grown to hundreds
of millions of dollars. 75 This single disaster generated a spill equal to
twenty percent of all of the spills in United States waters between 1980 and
1986.76
When totaled, a conservative estimate places tanker spills collectively
at over eighty million gallons of oil in the United States alone between
1980 and 1989. 77 Exacerbating the Exxon Valdez spill was a woeful lack
of preparedness for such an event. Before adequate measures could be
taken to control the advancing spill, an oil slick covered 1000 square
miles.78 After a $2 billion campaign that enlisted 11,000 workers, many
environmentalists assert that Exxon's oil is still present in dangerous
quantities along many of Alaska's beaches.79 Within weeks of the Exxon
Valdez catastrophe, three more large oil spills occurred in United States
waters, adding further impetus for Congress to quickly enact OPA. °
OPA establishes strict liability and creates a cause of action for oil
removal costs and damages.8' Additionally, Title I of OPA grants states a
savings clause that permits them to impose additional requirements with
respect to the discharge of oil.82 Such additional requirements can include
more harsh monetary penalties for spills that occur where a responsible
party has no defense.83 Responsible parties can include an owner of a
vessel, operators and demise charterers (those who lease a vessel for a
specified period of time), terminal and pipeline owners, and licensees of
deep water ports. 4 OPA requires vessels to have evidence of financial
responsibility adequate to cover liability that arises under the Act.85
74. See Millard, supra note 72, at 340-41.
75. See id. at 346.
76. See id. at 334.
77. See id.
78. See id. at 345.
79. See id.
80. See Harrington, supra note 7 1, at 7.
81. See Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2702, 2717.
82. See id. § 2718.
83. See id. § 2702-04.
84. See id. § 2701(32).
85. See id. § 2716(a)(2).
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Limitation of liability is removed in many circumstances. For example,
limitation will not apply if a vessel causes a spill through gross negligence,
the violation of a federal safety or operating regulation by a responsible
party acting pursuant to a contractual relationship, or for willful miscon-
duct. 6 Also, limitation will not apply if the responsible party fails to report
the incident or does not cooperate in the cleanup process. 87 Congress
explicitly negated the Act of 1851 when it drafted these provisions into
OPA 8 As we have seen, the Act of 1851 affords a vessel owner who is not
privy to the harm his vessel has caused, the ability to limit his liability to
the value of his vessel, and thereby shields him from claims in excess of
this investment. 9 Rescinding this protection is intended to increase tanker
owner vigilance of both crew and ship.
A liable party's defenses (and ability to limit liability) under OPA are
few and include only: (1) an act of God; (2) an act of war; or (3) when an
act or omission of a third party, other than an employee or agent of the
responsible party, where the responsible party can establish that he (A)
exercised due care with respect to the oil spill concerned and took into
consideration the characteristics of the oil spill in light of all relevant facts
and circumstances, and (B) took precautions against foreseeable acts or
omissions of any such third party and the foreseeable consequences of
those acts.' OPA permits indemnification agreements between parties, but
these agreements are only effective between the parties involved, not the
public. 91
OPA penalties are severe. Vessels greater than 3000 gross tons begin
with a fine of $1200 per ton up to $10 million; vessels less than 3000 gross
tons must pay $600 per ton with a limit of $2 million.' Money collected
from these fines goes into a government trust fund.93 Money available from
the fund is limited to $1 billion per incident and $500 million for damage
to natural resources. 4 Furthermore, the total damages assessed from an
offending vessel includes natural resource damages which consists of the
cost of restoring, rehabilitating, and replacing the damaged resource as well
as the reasonable cost of assessing those damages.95 OPA also seeks to
86. See id. § 2704(c)(1).
87. See id. § 2704(c)(2).
88. See id. § 2718(a).
89. See limitation of Shipowner's liability Act, 46 U.S.C. App § 183 (1994).
90. See 33 U.S.C. § 2703.
91. See id. § 2710.
92. See id. § 2704.
93. See id. § 2712.
94. See Millard, supra note 72, at 363.
95. See 33 U.S.C. § 2706(d)(1).
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prevent oil spills through measures that require new licensing procedures
for tanker captains and that tankers be double-hulled by the year 2016.'
VI. IMPLEMENTING OPA WITHIN MARITIME LAW:
APPLYING STATE LAW WITHIN ADMIRALTY LAW
The heart of the controversy between INTERTANKO and Washington
is whether OPA's savings clause should be applied to the whole of OPA or
to the portion in which the savings clause is directly written. In Section
2718 (Title I), OPA preserves to state authorities the ability to impose
additional requirements and penalties with respect to the discharge of oil
within that state.97 In this litigation, Washington relied upon OPA's Title
I savings clause to assert that the BAP Regulations are not preempted from
the field of oil spill prevention and removal by the provisions found in Title
IV of OPA.9" INTERTANKO countered this argument by contending that
OPA does not permit states to possess regulatory authority beyond the
elements listed in Title I (oil pollution liability and compensation). 9
INTERTANKO contended that because OPA's savings clause is not found
in the legislation's preamble, it only applies to Title I where it is located,
and therefore, the BAP Regulations overreach as they implicate pollution
prevention rather than pollution compensation."°° Although OPA does
waive a vessel owner's right to limitation of liability, the Act later states
that "except as otherwise provided . .. this chapter does not affect
admiralty or maritime law."' 0 ' The apparent conflict between broadly
applying OPA's state savings clause and limiting OPA's impact upon
general maritime law presents the dilemma on which INTERTANKO
centers.
Implementation of OPA's state savings clause has proven to be
controversial because the U.S. Constitution and the Judiciary Act of 1789
require that, in most instances, admiralty jurisdiction be reserved to federal
district courts where maritime law application will remain uniform. An
important line of Supreme Court cases following this principle of unifor-
mity disallows the incorporation of state law into maritime law. In Southern
Pacific v. Jensen, the Court forbade New York's attempt to thrust its
96. See Millard, supra note 72, at 366.
97. See 33 U.S.C. § 2718.
98. See INTERTANKO v. Lowry, 947 F. Supp. 1484, 1491 (W.D. Wash. 1996).
99. See id. at 1491-92
100. See INTERTANKO v. Locke, 148 F.3d 1053, 1059 (1998).
101. 33 U.S.C. § 275 1(e).
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workman's compensation scheme into the maritime realm. ° In Kossick v.
United Fruit Company, the Court held that New York's contract fraud
statute did not negate admiralty law's acceptance of an oral agreement
between a seaman and his captain. 3 Likewise, in Knickerbocker Ice
Company v. Stewart, the Court found that Congress could not require that
state law be accepted into admiralty law."° Uniformity of maritime law is
at the heart of Jensen and its progeny.
VII. THE SUPREME COURT'S INTERTANKO ANALYSIS
A. Federal Preemption and
Washington State's Best Achievable Protection (BAP)
To reach its conclusions in Locke, the Court relied upon the PWSA,
OPA, maritime law, and common law, including Askew v. American
Waterways Operators. In Askew, the Court permitted Florida to recover
clean-up costs by imposing strict liability for all oil-spill damage done to
the state and private citizens while ships are either inbound or leaving
Florida oil facilities."0 The Court reasoned that Florida's legislation did
not invade an area preempted by federal maritime law and that Florida's
police powers afforded its Legislature the authority to hold an oil-spiller
liable for harm he creates."°  Florida's action in Askew-although it
predates OPA-mimics OPA's Title I more closely than it does OPA's
Title IV vessel regulation. Therefore, Florida's oil spill liability statute
provided the Court guidance in determining what provisions a state may
include in a spill prevention statute.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, INTERTANKO argued that a narrow
reading of OPA yields a far different result than that reached by the Ninth
Circuit. The Court agreed with INTERTANKO on this point, finding that,
while OPA does clearly empower states to act in the field of oil spill
liability, Congress did not intend to establish comprehensive state
102. See Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
103. See Kossick v. United Fruit Company, 365 U.S. 731 (1961).
104. See Knickerbocker Ice Company v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920).
105. See Askew v. American Waterways Operators, 411 U.S. 325, 336 (1972).
106. See id.
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regulation of tankers."0 7 The Court reasoned that the preemptive power of
OPA did not reach into other comprehensive federal regulation of tankers,
including the PWSA.'
Justice Kennedy began the Court's analysis in INTERTANKO by
stating that "Washington has enacted legislation in an area where the
federal interest has been manifest since the beginning of our Republic and
is now well established."' 9 States have from time to time challenged the
sole authority of Congress to regulate maritime issues, and while the Court
has permitted some regulations promulgated by the states, the Constitution,
nonetheless, requires that maritime laws be uniform."' The Court has been
reluctant, therefore, to approve individual port regulation, except where
particular hazards necessitate a vessel to adhere to local regulation.
Maritime law permits individual state action when vessel safety and public
health are paramount."'
Police powers enable a state to regulate maritime activity within its
territorial waters. A situation exemplifying state police power is found in
Kelly v. Washington where, in 1937, Washington enacted legislation that
required safety inspections of all tugboats used within its waters. The tug
owners objected to these inspections because their vessels regularly
undertook interstate voyages that placed them beyond Washington's
jurisdiction." 2 The Supreme Court examined whether Washington's in-
spection program conflicted with federal law and it found that "in the
instant case, in relation to the inspection of the hull and machinery of
respondents' tugs, the state law touches that which the federal laws and
regulations have left untouched. There is plainly no inconsistency with
federal provisions."' 3 Washington, therefore, could require safety inspec-
tions for vessels plying its waters if such inspections did not interfere with
federal safety inspections. The BAP Regulations, however, test the reach
of authority the Court permitted to Washington under Kelly v. Washington.
107 See United States v. Locke, 120 S.Ct. 1135, 1146-47 (2000).
108. See id..
109. Id. at 1143.
110. See U.S. Const., art. III., § 2, cl. 1.
111. See Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299, 320 (1851).
112. See Kelly v. State of Washington, 302 U.S. 1 (1937).
113. ld. at 13.
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In 1978, Washington had tried to exercise police powers to influence
the standards a vessel must meet in order to sail in Washington waters. In
this instance, Washington required that tankers be double-hulled and twin-
screwed." Here the Court found that, unlike tugboat safety inspections,
vessel design and construction were beyond state regulation."' The Court
did, however, allow Washington to require tug escort for tankers within
specified state locales." 6 Washington's escort provision survived Court
scrutiny because it was consistent with Cooley v. Board of Wardens, a
nineteenth century case where the Court determined that individual states
could best manage locally inherent dangers by mandating when a vessel
should employ a local harbor pilot."7 In Locke, Justice Kennedy addressed
the issue of police power and local regulation, stating that "[t]he state laws
now in question bear upon national and international maritime commerce,
and in this area, there is no beginning assumption that concurrent regulation
by the state is a valid exercise of its police powers.""' The Court found
Washington's ascertainment of police powers unpersuasive, proclaiming
that a state's power to regulate tankers must be of very limited extraterrito-
rial effect and that Washington could not require a tanker to modify its
conduct beyond Puget Sound." 9
Justice Kennedy's decision left little room for state direction of tanker
activities beyond a state port. As written, therefore, the BAP Regulations
contradict United States treaties, including the 1974 International Conven-
tion for the Safety of Life at Sea,"2 the 1973 International Convention for
Prevention of Pollution from Ships,' and the 1978 International Conven-
tion of Standards of Training, Certification, and Watchkeeping for Sea-
farers. 2 2 The Court did not reach the question of whether the BAP Regula-
114. See Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 160 (1978).
115. Seei. at 159.
116. Seei. at 169.
117. See Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299, 320 (1851).
118. See United States v. Locke, 120 S.Ct. 1135, 1148 (2000).
119. Seeid. at 1139.
120. International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, done Nov. 1, 1974, T.I.A.S.
No. 9700, 1184 U.N.T.S. 2 (entered into force May 25, 1980).
121. International Convention for Prevention of Pollution from Ships, done Nov. 2,
1973, 12 1.L.M. 1319.
122. International Convention ofStandards of Training, Certification, and Watchkeeping
for Seafarers, done July 7, 1978, 25 S. TREATY Doc. No. 96-1, C.T.I.A. No. 7624.
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tions are explicitly invalid because of international treaty contradiction, but
rather, the Court relied upon federal preemption to strike down the
examined elements of Washington's legislation.'"
B. The Supreme Court's Analysis of BAP Provisions
The BAP Regulations affect sixteen aspects of tanker operations."2 Of
these, the Court of Appeals struck down only number fifteen, a provision
that deals with technology requirements as being impermissible under Ray
v. ARCO. 2' The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals regard-
ing this provision, but overturned and remanded the rest of the lower
court's findings.'26 Each of the BAP's sixteen provisions will now be
examined in light of the Court's findings.
The BAP Regulations' first provision, event reporting, requires that a
tanker report collisions and near-miss incidents that have occurred any time
in the vessel's operation during the past five years, including incidents that
occurred in Puget Sound.'2 The Court stuck down this provision by
asserting that "Congress intended that the Coast Guard regulations be the
sole source of a vessel's reporting obligations with respect to the matters
covered by the challenged state statue.' 2' The Coast Guard, therefore
"shall prescribe regulations on the marine casualties to be reported and the
manner of reporting." '29 Washington's dual reporting mechanism is invalid
because the state's requirement burdens a vessel in terms of cost and risk
of innocent noncompliance. 3 ° Additionally, the Court found that this BAP
Regulation "affects a vessel operator's out-of-state obligations and conduct,
where a State's jurisdiction and authority are most in doubt."' 3' One could
argue that event reporting presents no undue burden upon commerce; it
123. See United States v. Locke, 120 S.Ct. at 1145.
124. See Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978); see INTERTANKO v.
Locke, 148 F.3d 1053, 1057-58 (9th Cir. 1998).
125. See id. at 1066-67.
126. See United States v. Locke,120 S.Ct. at 1135.
127. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 317-21-130 (1999).
128. United States v. Locke, 120 S.Ct. at 1151.
129. Id. at 1151-52 (citing 46 U.S.C. § 6101).
130. Id., 120 S.Ct. at 1152 (citing The Roanoke, 189 U.S. 185, 195 (1903)).
131. Id.
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merely necessitates conveyance to port authorities specific information held
in a ship's log. The Court, however, found otherwise.
The second BAP Regulation is more complicated and includes two
elements."' The first requires that tankers employ specific watch practices,
namely that two licensed deck officers, a helmsman and a lookout be on
duty while either navigating in state waters or while at anchor. The second
portion requires that bridge management systems adhere to the "standard
practice throughout the operator's fleet." '33 The Court found that the
general watch requirement was not tied to "the particularities of the Puget
Sound; it applies throughout Washington's waters and at all times. It is a
general operating requirement and is pre-empted as an attempt to regulate
a tanker's 'operation' and 'manning' under 33 U.S.C. § 3703(a)."'34 The
Court left Washington the option to rewrite this statute so that it only
encompasses vessels navigating Puget Sound.'35 It is somewhat surprising
that the Court struck down this provision because it merely reiterates what
is found in federal regulations, namely that a foreign country have safety
standards for vessels that are at least the equivalent to that of the United
States.136 If Washington requires a ship to maintain standards that are
already required by United States laws, then Washington has neither added
to, nor disturbed current federal regulation.
The BAP Regulations' third section states that crews navigating a
tanker in state waters should record the vessel's position every fifteen
minutes, write a comprehensive voyage plan before entering Washington
waters, and frequently take compass bearings. 137 Although the Court re-
manded this issue to the lower court, it would seem likely that this BAP
provision is preempted, as was provision one, because it infringes upon
Coast Guard vessel management. BAP Regulations' third section does
present the specter of preemption because under the Ports and Waterways
Safety Act, Congress granted vessel routing authority solely to the Coast
Guard. 3 1 If the lower court determines that such position reporting is too
132. See WASH. ADMiN. CODE § 317-21-200 (1999).
133. Id.
134. United States v. Locke, 120 S.Ct. at 1179.
135. See il at 1143.
136. See 46 U.S.C. § 9101(a)(3).
137. See WASH. ADmIN. CODE § 317-21-205 (1999).
138. See Ports and Waterways Safety Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1221 (1994).
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burdensome on a crew, this task could be effected by the local pilot
assistant while stationed on board.
The Court remanded the fourth section of the BAP Regulations, one
that requires a vessel to employ specified engineering practices. 39 If these
practices are consistent with Huron Portland Cement v. City of Detroit,"4
then state police powers are properly employed to regulate vessel activity.
Huron should not be too broadly applied, however. Detroit's smoke
abatement policy addressed only active polluting, it did not require a vessel
to alter its engines or modify the crew's engine maintenance proce-
dure-both of which were already federally approved. Huron only forbade
the operation of a non-compliant engine along Detroit's water-front.' 4 '
The Court also remanded the fifth section of BAP Regulations, which
involves pre-arrival engine tests and inspections.142 This provision does not
unduly burden the uniformity of maritime commerce, it merely dictates
specific inspections of existing equipment. 43 If these inspections are not
being currently followed by a particular vessel, Huron's police powers will
likely apply when such inspections are necessary for public safety.
Remanded section six of the BAP Regulations covers emergency
procedures1" and is probably preempted because requiring written crew
assignments infringes directly upon federal regulation, including when
emergency drills are required.'45 Also, BAP's requirement that crew mem-
bers be tested for drug and alcohol abuse is a subject covered by existing
federal law."4
Washington's statute dictates in section seven that a vessel is forbidden
from altering its plotting records if such records detail a collision that
occurred in state waters. 47 This section was remanded and the lower court
will likely find that it is covered by existing Coast Guard authority.
Sections eight through thirteen all involve personnel requisites that expand
139. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 317-21-210 (1999).
140. See Huron Portland Cement v. City of Detroit, 361 U.S. 806 (allowing Detroit's
smoke abatement policy to supersede federal certification of a steam engine).
141. See id.
142. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 317-21-215 (1999).
143. See id.
144. See id. § 317-21-220 (1999).
145. See 46 U.S.C. § 8104(f)(1)-(4).
146. See Ports and Waterways Safety Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1221 (1994).
147 See id. § 317-21-225 (1999).
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extensive federal regulation of crews.1 The Court specifically found that
sections eight and twelve are preempted149 and it is likely that the lower
court will strike down the rest of these remanded provisions as being
preempted.
Section fourteen's requirement that technological improvements be
incorporated'50 infringes upon federal vessel requirements and the Court's
finding in Ray that vessel design is beyond state regulation.15 It is likely
therefore that the lower court will deny Washington application of this
provision. Section fifteen has already been discussed as being struck down
by the Court of Appeals. Section fifteen152 provided that tankers be equip-
ped with special navigation equipment in violation of the Court's holding
in Ray that states can not regulate tanker design.5 The BAP's final
section, number sixteen, requires that a vessel provide advance notice of its
arrival."M This provision seems to be within Cooley's reach, in that
advance notice will grant local authorities time to allocate a pilot to the
arriving vessel.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in INTERTANKO has left little room for
individual state tanker regulation. By relying primarily upon the PWSA,
the Court has denied the states power to influence tanker design and
severely limited local vessel traffic control. States are also forbidden the
ability to require tanker record keeping that could alert local authorities that
a "problem" vessel has arrived. Instead, the Supreme Court has found that
the PWSA grants the Coast Guard comprehensive management authority
over vessel traffic that is exclusive of state involvement unless such
involvement is in accord with either Cooley or Huron. Moreover, the
148. See id. §§ 317-21-230, 235, 240,245,250,255 (1999).
149. See United States v. Locke, 120 S.Ct. 1135, 1150 (2000).
150. See WASH. ADMN. CODE § 317-21-260 (1999).
151. See United States v. Locke, 120 S.Ct. at 1138-39; see also Ray v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 160-61 (1978).
152. See WASH. ADMiN. CODE § 317-21-265 (1999).
153. See Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. at 160-61.
154. See WASH. ADmiN. CODE § 317-21-540 (1999).
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Court's narrow reading of OPA's savings clause precludes state regulation
of tankers beyond establishing liability for oil spills.
OPA has greatly advanced a state's ability to seek claims against a
vessel for damages resulting from a spill by removing the Act of 1851, but
this is where the Court has drawn the line. Aggressive tanker regulation
that is not in accord with federal requirements will not stand. It is therefore
unlikely that Rhode Island's tanker barge regulations will remain effective,
particularly those that affect barge design. OPA has enabled states to
regulate liability for spills beyond federal standards, but the Court has held
that this is the limit that OPA affords a state to reach. Beyond OPA's
scope, state regulation, such as that in California, Rhode Island, Washing-
ton and elsewhere, is restricted by federal statute and maritime law.
The Court has made clear its determination to keep maritime law and
the regulation of vessels under federal control as much as possible, save in
situations that are particular to a port and require individual regulation.
The Court seems to have left Washington the option of relying upon Cooley
to regulate tanker activity that is particular to Puget Sound. It is equally
clear that Washington can not pass blanket regulations that continually
affect tankers throughout all state waterways. The Court's message is
clear: state regulation of ships must be limited to obviating local dangers
concealed within a specific port. State police powers can accomplish this
end. INTERTANKO plainly asserts that the Court will not tolerate any
disturbance of federal maritime law by over-reaching state regulations that
affect different ports in an identical manner. Perhaps parts of the BAP
Regulations will reappear as the Washington legislature redrafts it in accord
with the Court's directions-we will have to wait to see.
